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The purpose of this report is to offer investigators and members of SCRO and animal research com-
mittees well-grounded ethical standards for evaluating research involving the transfer of multipotent
and pluripotent human stem cells and their direct derivatives into animal systems. This report is de-
liberately written in general terms so that its recommendations can apply to diverse institutions and
international settings. Thus, investigators and reviewers should aspire to these proposed ethical
standards while exercising appropriate judgment in individual situations.Categories of Human-to-Animal Chimera Research
Chimeras are organisms containing cells from two or more
zygotes or the imperfect equivalents thereof (such as par-
thenotes). Scientists widely consider chimera studies to
be indispensable for answering fundamental questions
in stem cell (Tam and Rossant, 2003) and developmental
biology (McLaren, 1976). In stem cell research, human-
to-animal chimera experiments typically involve the transfer
of multipotent or pluripotent human stem cells into ani-
mals in embryonic, fetal, or postnatal stages of develop-
ment to study stem cell behavior. Other forms of human-
to-animal chimera studies involve transferring into animals
human stem cell derivatives that are no longer pluripotent
or multipotent for preclinical research. We set aside for
discussion elsewhere the topic of nuclear-cytoplasmic hy-
brid research—e.g., the use of animal oocytes for human
nuclear transfer experiments—although much of our anal-
ysis in this report is applicable to that form of research.
One common type of human-to-animal chimera study is
the use of human embryonic stem cells (hES cells) to form
teratomas in immunodeficient mice to assess stem cell
quality and developmental potential. While this routine
practice raises no ethical difficulties (McLaren, 2007)
(see Lensch et al., 2007), other forms of chimera research
may—such as preimplantation studies resulting in high
but transient levels of human-to-animal chimerism in vitro
(Karpowicz et al., 2004), and the transfer of differentiated
human stem cells into the central nervous systems of
higher-order animals (Greene et al., 2005).
These examples underscore the need to distinguish be-
tween two categories of chimera research: (1) in vitro stud-
ies using animal embryos before the development of the
primitive streak; and (2) in vivo studies involving sentient
animals. While both categories of research provoke in-
triguing questions, the latter raises additional issues of
animal welfare and should be examined accordingly. We
do this after first exploring two fundamental concerns
that pertain to chimera research as such.
Commonly Held Concerns and Assumptions
about Chimera Research
Much of the controversy with chimera research reflects
uneasiness with crossing what are assumed to be morally
inviolable species borders (Robert and Baylis, 2003). Thus
an ethical framework on chimera research cannot ignoretwo central questions. First, is crossing species bound-
aries wrong? And second, does the generation of stem
cell chimeras represent a particular instance of this cross-
ing that raises special concerns?
History shows that humans and animals have always
been exchanging bits of their biological matter, intention-
ally or by chance, naturally or through artificial aids of var-
ious sorts. Yet unlike stem cell chimera research, the ma-
jority of these encounters do not elicit fear or opposition.
Diet is a good example. With few exceptions, humans
accept the entry of animal products into our daily metab-
olism. However, diet influences our bodies at both genetic
and epigenetic levels. The effect of certain classes of nu-
trients on the methylation level of our DNA (one of the most
meaningful types of epigenetic modification) is the best
defined example of the enduring effect of diet on our ge-
netic networks, an effect that might be even passed on
to future generations (Cropley et al., 2006).
Vaccines and xenotransplantation are other more visi-
ble instances of animal-human mixing. For example, mil-
lions of patients worldwide live with heart valves harvested
from pigs or cows. In these instances, resistance is nor-
mally based on specific dangers (for example, the risk of
transmitting animal viruses to humans) rather than on gen-
eral condemnation of human-animal mixing per se.
The different reactions elicited by these various modal-
ities of human-animal mixing suggest that fears are di-
rectly related to the degree of deterministic biological
agency that is attributed to the ‘‘fundamental units’’ that
get mixed. Animal cells broken down to simple metabo-
lites (as in the diet), or perceived as simple scaffolds (as
in valve replacement), are considered largely unproblem-
atic, whereas the mixing of stem cells or genes may in-
duce deep-seated aversion. This is in turn the result of
a tacit understanding of living systems that has percolated
deeply into the public discourse and that grants genes and
stem cells a degree of deterministic biological agency that
other cells or metabolites do not possess. It is an ironic, al-
though predictable, twist of fate that the more genes and
stem cells are presented to the public as ultimate determi-
nants of life, the more they are granted this status.
The different types of human-animal mixing considered
above actually present a continuum of options, in which
the lines to be drawn between the acceptable and the un-
acceptable do not align neatly with preexisting biologicalCell Stem Cell 1, August 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 159
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often inaccurate perception. The most recent understand-
ing of gene and cell function from both molecular biology
and philosophy of biology challenges the view of genes or
cells as deterministic agents of biological phenotypes. For
example, what does ‘‘animal or human gene’’ or ‘‘animal
or human cell’’ actually mean? In the light of the evolution-
ary conservation of many signaling pathways, ‘‘human or
animal genes or cells’’ can refer only to the fact that these
units have a human or animal origin. But from this it does
not follow that an animal gene or cell, once put into a hu-
man, behaves as an independent unit of ‘‘animal agency’’
or vice versa. In other words, what is at stake is what
happens to developmental trajectories when signaling
modules from different species are mixed (whether
these modules come in the flavor of genes, cells, proteins,
etc.).
A clear reminder of this point comes from molecular bi-
ology in the 1990s, when scientists defined the genetic hi-
erarchy underlying the development of the eye (Halder
et al., 1995). A single gene, transplanted in tissues of the
fly embryo such as the wings and the legs, was able to di-
rect the formation of a whole eye, an ectopic eye. And yet,
when the homolog human gene was transferred into
a mouse to check for its ability to rescue the small eye mu-
tation, the result remained compelling: again, an eye was
formed, testifying to the remarkable evolutionary conser-
vation of genes and developmental pathways. But, as ex-
pected, a human gene in the mouse rescues a mouse eye
(Schedl et al., 1996). And although cells embody a clearly
higher degree of agency than genes, they also are exqui-
sitely dependent on their surroundings. Besides the obvi-
ous example of bone marrow transplantation, in which the
hematopoietic stem cell is an ‘‘agent’’ in blood reconstitu-
tion only in a receptive host, local niches regulate key de-
velopmental transitions for several adult stem cell types in
what has been aptly termed an ‘‘inseparable relationship’’
(Xie and Li, 2007). And well-characterized cases of trans-
differentiation, from tail regeneration in axolotl to inflam-
mation-induced lymphangiogenesis, highlight to what ex-
tent the microenvironment can shape cell function
(Echeverri and Tanaka, 2002; Maruyama et al., 2005).
Context, in other words, is just as essential as genes or
cells.
It is revealing to juxtapose these experiments with per-
haps the best known example of a human-to-animal chi-
mera produced by genetic engineering: a mouse with a hu-
man ear growing on its back—which, to be sure, was
neither a human-to-animal chimera, nor a product of ge-
netic engineering. In 1997, tissue engineers grafted bovine
knee cartilage cells onto a biodegradable scaffold molded
into a small ear (Cao et al., 1997). They then implanted this
scaffold on the back of the mouse so that the cartilage
cells could be supplied by the blood vessels of the skin.
The bovine ear on the back of the mouse is a relevant
counterpart to the mouse eye rescued with a homolog
human gene, highlighting the conceptual and practical dif-
ference between mixing tissues (a usually well-accepted
practice) and mixing genes (the source of great fears).160 Cell Stem Cell 1, August 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.The iconic image of the human ear on the back of a mouse
reveals that this notable so-called ‘‘chimera’’ owes much
to an engineering of scaffolds and nothing to an engineer-
ing of genes.
We may now revisit the two questions posed earlier.
First, human-animal crossing is not wrong per se and is
in fact a persistent feature of human societies. Second,
stem cell or gene chimeras do not represent an excep-
tional case, because neither stem cells nor genes can be
handled a priori as biologically deterministic agents inde-
pendent of their context. And to the extent that some cells
may be, for all practical matters, more ‘‘context indepen-
dent’’ than genes, a tenable ethical framework needs, on
a case-by-case basis, a sound assessment of the devel-
opmental trajectories that are likely to be affected and
that takes into account the epigenetic context of regula-
tion in which the mixed genes or cells are going to be de-
ployed. Such a process is set forth in the Recommenda-
tions section.
If the mixing of human and animal matter is neither new
nor particularly problematic per se, are there other rea-
sons to reject human-to-animal chimera research as mor-
ally wrong? Another major objection relies on the idea that
human-animal mixing threatens human dignity. In particu-
lar, the concern is that transferring human stem cells and
their derivatives may entail the emergence of uniquely hu-
man psychological functions in animal chimeras, thus
undermining human dignity (Karpowicz et al., 2005).
However, the ‘‘threat to human dignity argument’’ is se-
riously flawed. The first problem is that the conclusion
does not logically follow from the premises. Human dignity
is a multifaceted and culturally relative notion that is char-
acterized (at least minimally) by a family of nearly unique
and valuable capacities generally found in human beings,
such as the capacity for moral agency, self-awareness,
empathy, and high-level emotional and cognitive func-
tions. These mental properties are not unique to, but taken
as a whole are intrinsic to, human beings, and as such
cannot be diminished even if, hypothetically, animal chi-
meras were to emerge with complex psychological ca-
pacities associated with human dignity. Simply put, hu-
man dignity is not something that diminishes when it is
ascribed to more individuals.
Second, human dignity is not a property of human cells.
It is a property of human beings. While recognizing and
valuing human dignity, it is important to avoid the mistaken
reductionist view that would enshrine human dignity in
stem cells and specialized tissues rather than human be-
ings. Of course, humans are part of a vast evolutionary
web including many species with ‘‘human-like’’ proper-
ties, including varying degrees of cognition, emotive ca-
pacity, and social interdependence. Therefore, while it is
important to reiterate that chimera research, like all re-
search on nonchimeric animal species, should be gov-
erned by animal welfare principles, it is also important
that those principles are sufficiently developed to protect
animal subjects of research of human-like mind, were
such an outcome in fact to emerge regardless of the
goal of the research (cf. Streiffer, 2005).
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posal for evaluating the permissibility of human-to-animal
chimera studies, setting in place the ethical guidelines that
must be present should such research be considered.
Avoiding Unwarranted Stem Cell Exceptionalism
For decades, animal chimeras have served as a valuable
research tool in diverse areas of biomedical research. Hu-
man primary tumor cell lines are commonly transplanted
into experimental mice in the course of cancer research.
And SCID-hu mouse models of the human immune sys-
tem have been widely used since the 1980s. Consider-
ations of fairness and justice dictate that one avoids un-
warranted stem cell exceptionalism in assessing the
permissibility of human-to-animal chimera studies in
stem cell research. That is, one should use existing ethical
standards for research, unless something specific to stem
cell research drives a need for additional ethical stan-
dards. Accepting this basic principle of justice (treating
like cases alike) means that one should adhere as much
as possible to ethical analytic structures used in relevantly
similar contexts.
For in vitro chimera studies, we recommend adherence
to the ISSCR guidelines that no in vitro cultures of animal
stem cells into human embryos be allowed to develop for
longer than 14 days or until the formation of the primitive
streak, and that no products of research involving trans-
ferred human cells be implanted into a human or nonhu-
man primate uterus (International Society of Stem Cell Re-
search, 2006). These recommendations imply that the
moral status of the research embryo up to 14 days of de-
velopment is not affected by the possible degree of chi-
merism, in line with the rejection of unwarranted stem
cell exceptionalism.
For chimera studies involving the transfer of human
stem cells or their direct derivatives into gestated animals,
we recommend building on existing animal welfare struc-
tures for animal research, adding stem cell-specific stan-
dards to address hypothetical developmental potential
and trajectories.
Building on Ethical Standards for Animal Research
Over more than the last half-century, there has evolved
a well-defined scientific and ethical tradition to guide the
ethical use of animals in scientific research. This tradition
is expressed through laws, international and national guid-
ance documents, and international standards for volun-
tary accreditation (e.g., Association for Assessment and
Accreditation of Laboratory Care International, http://
www.aaalac.org), as well as in academic literature (Na-
tional Research Council, 1998; Orlans, 1993; Rollin and
Kesel, 1990).
Common principles include (but are not limited to) the
following: (1) the research must have substantial scientific
merit, and there must be no acceptable alternative
method for answering the research question; (2) the re-
search must be conducted in appropriate facilities by
well-trained and supported staff; (3) the fewest possible
animals must be used, without undue pain and stress,and with environmental enrichment appropriate to the
species; (4) experimental endpoints must be clearly de-
fined, and euthanasia must be conducted humanely ac-
cording to approved methods; (5) an independent review
body should provide ongoing review and monitoring,
with the power to suspend or terminate studies.
A significant literature has developed that details stan-
dards of care, behavioral norms and indicators (e.g., Ca-
nadian Council on Animal Care, 1993; National Research
Council, 1996), and species-specific tests used in neuro-
science and behavioral research that are instrumental in
assessing pain, anxiety, and suffering of sentient research
animals (National Research Council, 2003). In using the
term sentience here, we borrow from a literature that pro-
vides no single definitive term but points to qualities of
mind that are related to awareness, cognition, and the suf-
fering that could be occasioned by research. These are
functionally relevant to animal welfare principles that
physical and mental suffering should be minimized.
Many current animal welfare tests are primarily species
specific; this raises special questions for chimeras, at
least those in which the significant potential for a change
in sentience or behavior is theoretically anticipated. These
concerns are justified not by experience or practically
grounded expectations but by reasonable caution. Similar
issues arise with transgenic animals, in that both new
norms of behavior, and new defects which require special
care, may arise from the genetic alteration. Best practices
in such cases have been well defined (e.g., Canadian
Council on Animal Care, 1993; National Research Council,
1996) and include establishing baseline data for trans-
genic animals; vigorous data collection during research
concerning any deviation from the norms of typical ani-
mals; use of pilot studies; and ongoing monitoring and re-
porting to oversight committees empowered to evaluate
the need for prompt protocol changes and withdrawal of
animal subjects. The application of these steps to chime-
ric animals is set forth in the next section.
Recommendations
Having considered the common arguments against hu-
man-to-animal chimera research and the need to avoid
unwarranted stem cell exceptionalism, we offer the follow-
ing recommendations.
(1) Chimera research presupposes an adequate scien-
tific and ethical infrastructure for nonchimeric in vitro
and animal research. Proposed research must have scien-
tific merit, be directed to the increase of knowledge and
potential public benefit, take place in appropriate facilities
with properly trained and supported scientists and staff,
and be peer reviewed. Chimera research should be sub-
ject to the general animal welfare principle that, to the ex-
tent practicable, research on nonsentient constructs
should be employed before research on sentient animals,
and research on less sentient animals should be preferred
to research on more sentient ones.
(2) Chimera research involving human stem cells, to the
extent that it involves creating, gestating, and raising an
animal with significantly increased potential for sentience,Cell Stem Cell 1, August 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 161
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the standards recognized for research with animal
models. This means, for example, that it should be based
on rational, practical, fact-based assessments of its ef-
fects on sentience, rather than merely speculative con-
cerns about increases in intelligence contrary to what is
known about brain functional requirements and known
scientific facts.
(3) Additional data collection and monitoring should be
commensurate with the anticipated characteristics of the
chimeric animal in the context of the proposed research.
Creation of a teratoma to confirm stem cells’ characteris-
tics should require no additional or exceptional monitoring
beyond the application of animal welfare principles,
whereas a significant contribution to the central nervous
system by hES cells or their direct derivatives will require
additional considerations. One cannot assume that hES
cell chimerism will always supplement the awareness
and capacities of a chimera. The chimeric intervention
may have no predicted or reasonably predictable effect
on sentience, in which case review should be satisfied
by application of traditional animal welfare principles. To
be sure, even in such cases, precisely because a chimera
is an interruption of an animal’s known characteristic equi-
librium, chimerism may create deficiencies and other is-
sues that, as with transgenics and knockout animal
models, require special scientific and ethical consider-
ation of the effect of proposed research on the chimeric
animal. These should be addressed through diligent appli-
cation of ethical principles for the protection of animals in
research, and primarily through regular mechanisms.
(4) Monitoring and data collection should be based
upon a sound assessment of the developmental trajecto-
ries that are likely to be affected, and take into account the
epigenetic context of regulation in which the mixed genes
or cells are going to be deployed. It should be grounded in
knowledge of such trajectories and reasonable scientific
inferences concerning their potential, together with thor-
ough reference to the tests and assessments currently
available for the host species (e.g., Canadian Council on
Animal Care, 1993; National Research Council, 1996). Re-
view committees should avoid data collection for the sake
of data collection, with the meaningfulness of the data to
be determined later, or translating uncertainty into tests
and additional procedures whose materiality is not well
grounded in scientific knowledge and inference. Data col-
lection should be linked to known functional links, or links
to be evaluated in a scientifically legitimate manner. No
single test, such as the percentage presence of human-
derived cells in the brain, should be necessarily required,
unless its functional link to pertinent physical or mental
qualities is either demonstrated or is consistent with sci-
entific knowledge or scientifically reasonable inferences
concerning whether, in the context of other data, it will
be a valid predictor of sentience. Neuroscientific and other
research should further identify what tests meet this re-
quirement, and it will be important that researchers and
journals make research results rapidly available so that
SCROs can take advantage of the rigor it provides. With162 Cell Stem Cell 1, August 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.that research, further guidelines will be possible based
on well-grounded physical, behavioral, and other parame-
ters.
(5) Chimera neuroscientific research involving human
stem cells or their direct derivatives, in hypothetically ap-
proximating some aspects of human functioning, may
thus demand accepted or new specialized cognitive and
other assessments of the sort conducted in neuroscien-
tific research. There may be an irreducible degree of un-
certainty about the cognitive nature of the new chimeric
animal, and how it would manifest distress, anxiety, or
other factors relevant to one’s assessment of animal wel-
fare. In such cases, as with transgenic animals, re-
searchers and institutions should familiarize themselves
with these options, which may not be widely known to
them, and consider requiring that a baseline of normal
data be created before experimentation is permitted,
keeping in mind the requirement above that data collec-
tion should be required only if its scientific and ethical ma-
teriality is either demonstrated or based on reasonable
and rigorous scientific knowledge or inferences. These
data could include behavioral and other data necessary
for animal welfare, but may also include appropriate phys-
iological (including endocrine data related to indicators of
stress, anxiety, and pleasure), anatomic, morphological,
and other data suggestive of the degree of integration
with human cell types, if any, and the functioning of those
cells and the functional potential of the resulting chimeric
brain. As with transgenic animals, investigators and insti-
tutions should consider requiring the use of pilot studies
to produce initial data on chimeric animals subject to ex-
perimental interventions, employ ongoing monitoring of
deviations from normal behaviors, and prescribe reporting
to pertinent animal welfare committees. Because new be-
haviors may be elusive, investigators and institutions
should use objective evaluations when possible, and mit-
igate interobserver subjectivity when subjective tests are
used.
(6) Investigators and institutions should also make ap-
propriate adjustments to research protocols to take into
account new data or unanticipated responses from animal
subjects relating to the ethical permissibility of the ani-
mal’s participation in the study, including novel signals
demonstrating deterioration or enhancement of an ani-
mal’s condition and other factors pertinent to withdraw-
ing the animal from the study. Regular reassessment of
animal welfare during the course of experimentation is
strongly encouraged.
(7) Research with the known, intended, or well-
grounded significant potential to create humanized cogni-
tion, awareness, or other mental attributes, while not ab-
solutely prohibited, should be subject to close scrutiny,
taking the most careful steps to collect data pertinent to
ethical protection of animal subjects, and an extraordinary
degree of justification.
(8) Protocols, to be eligible for review, must satisfy ap-
propriate animal welfare standards and must in addition
specifically address and propose an appropriate plan for
the issues identified in recommendations 2–7.
Cell Stem Cell
ISSCR: Committee Forum(9) Through retained advisors or committee diversity, re-
view committees should ensure that they have sufficient
scientific expertise to make appropriate judgments con-
cerning the matters discussed in these recommendations.
There should be flexibility in the precise allocation of re-
sponsibility for implementation of these principles be-
tween SCROs and institutional or local animal welfare
committees. Ultimately, however, it is the responsibility
of the SCRO to ensure that all elements have been met,
and to receive, review, and act on ongoing notices of
any concerns or unanticipated issues. It is the responsibil-
ity of the institution in which the research occurs to work
with the SCRO, and with other review bodies, to address
local social and ethical concerns.
These recommendations build on, and are consistent
with, current ethical standards for biomedical and basic
science research. We offer them to clarify the ethical stan-
dards for evaluating human-to-animal chimera experi-
ments in stem cell research, and to identify those areas
for further scientific research and publication that will be
ethically material as the research continues.
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